Approved For Release 2003/08/05X:1CIA-RDP81-01036R000100140004-2 SECRET 1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 INFORMATION REPORT 25X1 COUNTRY Poland/USSR REPORT NO. 25X1 SUBJECT Delay in Sending Moscow Instructions to the Polish Communist Party 25X1 DATE DISTR. 3 MAR 54 NO. OF PAGES 1 THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE WID 794, OF THE U.S. CODE. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OF REVE NO. OF ENCLS. 25X1 ATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON BITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS REPORT IS PROHIBITED SUPP. TO THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION REPORT NO.

- 1. A confused situation was created in the Polish Communist Party because of the prolonged absence of any directives from Moscow after Stalin's death, regarding eventual changes in the general line of the Polish Communist Party's policy. This lack of directives led to serious quarrels at the secret Party Central Committee meeting on 2 and 3 Oct 53, when two trends clashed: one favoring considerable "liberalization" of domestic and economic-social policy; the other, favoring more severe security control and disciplinary measures on workers and peasants for the fulfillment of the planned tasks. The violent exchanges remained inconclusive and the secret meeting ended in an upream.
- 2. The Central Committee to open meeting was called for the end of October 1953, and it decided to convene a Party Congress in mid February 1954. But still there were no in structions from Moscow. Apparently, early in January 1954 these instructions arrived as a result of which all the preparatory work done in anticipation of the February Party Congress had to be cancelled, and new programs, new speeches, a new Party policy had to be evolved. All this could not be done in the remaining short time (for a February Congress), so the Party Congress was postponed until 16 Mar 54, which has been officially announced.
- 7. The above reported Moscow delay is of interest, because it is a result of the internal differences in the Soviet Communist Party, especially among the top leaders, between <u>Malenkov</u> and the younger "managers" standing for "liberalization", while the old hands (<u>Voroshilov</u>, <u>Molotov</u>, <u>Bulganin</u> and <u>Kaganovich</u>) demand stronger discipline and wish to enforce it by means of more force and terror.
- 4. The belated instructions to Poland, may mean that some kind of crystalization in the Soviet Communist Party's political program took place late in December (Beria was executed on 23 Dec 53) and allowed instructions to be sent to the Folish Communists at the beginning of January. These instructions are at present being studied by the Polish Politburo members, and have not yet been cranslated into definite moves.

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